ABSTRACT. We examine a competitive market in which producers and consumers are scattered around the economy, linked by a network with finite capacity, along which the good has to be delivered for consumption. A most prominent example would be the deregulated electric power market. Because of the complexity of transaction across the network, the equilibrium allocation is generally complicated. However, we can focus without loss of generality on a class of allocations, called simple allocations, in which the net transaction over a link is equal to the gross transaction over the same link. If a simple allocation can be sustained by an equilibrium, then the allocation must be efficient. If an equilibrium induces a simple allocation that is no longer sustained by an equilibrium, the original equilibrium allocation is not efficient. For any efficient allocation, we can find a simple allocation that can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium, which reveals the structure of the competitive equilibrium allocations and the equilibrium prices.
INTRODUCTION
This paper rigorously investigates the competitive equilibrium of the network economy, in which the goods must be delivered from producers to consumers through a network with finite transmission capacity. Examples include telecommunication, electric power and gas pipeline industries, which are undergoing transformation from regulated monopoly to a competitive market. Our main interest is to understand how the network structure influences the competitive equilibrium outcome, which serves as a benchmark for evaluating the deregulated market. We focus on the short run problem in which the decision maker has to cope with the existing network structure. 1 The insight obtained from the short run problem is essential for designing and improving a market for the deregulated network industry. The California electricity market is a primary example which will be mentioned throughout this paper. I am grateful for comments from John Conley, Hyunsook Kim, Arash Mahdian, Akihiko Matsui, Rui Zhao and, especially, Sam Lovick. I learned about the California power market through private communication with Bob Wilson, whom I thank for his generosity. The insightful criticism from two anonymous referees and the editor, Joe Harrington, helps improve the substance and the exposition of the paper. I also thank the Korea Economic Research Institute for its hospitality when this project was initiated during my visit. Financial support from National Science Foundation (SES-0004315) is gratefully acknowledged. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
1 Throughout this paper, we shall consider the network as a constraint in contrast to some of the existing work on the networks in which the structure is endogenously formed (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , Jackson and Watts (2002) , Kranton and Minehart (2001) , and Bala and Goyal ()).
In a market without transmission constraint, more trading opportunities help the market realize the potential gains from trading. One of the key design features of the California electricity market and the new English market is to remove restrictions on bilateral trading between buyers and sellers. We shall demonstrate through a simple example, however, that the network constraint may generate an inefficient equilibrium. The structure of the competitive equilibrium reveals the way how one can control bilateral trades to ensure efficient allocation.
Because one of the main objectives of deregulation is to promote competition, the existence of market power has been central for evaluating the performance of the market design (e.g., Wolfram (1999) , Wolak and Patrick (1997) , Borenstein and Bushnell (1998) , Borenstein, Bushnell, and Knittel (1999) , Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2000) , Puller (2001) , and Joskow and Kahn (2001) ). In a competitive market without the network constraints, the delivery price must be equal to the marginal production cost of the marginal supplier, and the production capacity must be exhausted to meet the demand. Thus, if the delivery price is higher than the marginal cost, or if some plants do not exhaust the production capacity despite positive excess demand (i.e., capacity withdrawal), then one can conclude that market power or some form of strategic move leads to dead weight loss of social welfare. In the presence of the network constraints, however, we can observe the spurious deviation from competitive behavior even if the agents are price takers. A delivery price higher than the marginal cost, or the unused production capacity could be evidence of the impact of transmission line congestion, or of the inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium rather than market power.
For analytic tractability, we assume that the network has a radial structure. A primary example would be the major electric power network of California, depicted in Figure  1 . In a radial network, for any two different locations within the same network, there is exactly one route along which the goods can be transported. This assumption excludes a loop within the network. While the radial network structure leaves out some interesting networks, we still achieve significant generality over existing papers on the network industry that either assume a rudimentary network structure (e.g., Joskow and Tirole (2000) , Borenstein, Bushnell, and Stoft (1999) and Boucher and Smeers (2001) ) or suppress the constraint imposed by finite transportation capacity entirely (e.g., Wolfram (1999) , Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2000) and Puller (2001) ).
The complexity of the transaction over the network makes it very cumbersome to identify the feasible set of actions for each agent and difficult to calculate an equilibrium. We identify a subset of allocations, which have tractable transaction patterns over the network, yet are general enough to support all feasible allocations. We introduce the notion of a simple allocation in which the transportation along the network is simple in the sense that the net amount of trade over a link is precisely the total amount of goods that move along the link. We show that there is no loss of generality by restricting the analysis to simple allocations: For any feasible allocation, we can construct a simple allocation in which the consumer receives the same amount of goods and the seller produces the same amount of goods as in the original allocation. In this case, we say that the simple allocation is equivalent to the original allocation.
Although some equilibria are not efficient, we can recover the first welfare theorem over the simple allocations: If a simple allocation is an equilibrium allocation, then the equilibrium is efficient. An example shows that even though a simple allocation is equivalent to the original equilibrium allocation, the simple allocation need not remain an equilibrium. In fact, the original equilibrium allocation is efficient if, and only if, the equivalent simple allocation remains an equilibrium allocation. We can also establish the second welfare theorem in terms of the simple allocations: For any efficient allocation, we can find an equivalent simple allocation that can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium, which also establishes the existence of an efficient simple allocation. The constructed equilibrium has many features not found in the case in which there exists no transportation capacity constraint. For example, the equilibrium allocation partitions the network into a smaller network in which every node can be reached through an un-congested link. Within this segmented network, the law of single price prevails in equilibrium, because otherwise, one can make positive profit through arbitrage. However, because the network is partitioned into smaller networks, we need more than one price to clear the market over the entire network. The algorithm of finding the equilibrium price for the second welfare theorem reveals the details of the efficient equilibrium allocation and its relation to the congested links.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the definitions and describe the model as well as the equilibrium concept. In order to illuminate the impact of counter-flow and finite transmission capacity, section 3 examines a simple example to show that an equilibrium can be inefficient in a network economy. In section 4, we characterize the equilibrium by using simple allocation and show how simple allocation can reveal the welfare property of the equilibrium allocation. Section 5 examines an existing market design to internalize the externalities generated by counter-flow and finite transmission capacity to demonstrate that our analysis can enhance the design to achieve an efficient allocation. Section 6 discusses some extensions and applications. Section 7 concludes the paper with a brief discussion about the future research.
2. PRELIMINARIES 2.1. Preference, technology and network. We examine an economy with a network of plants, which are separated by a certain distance, and each plant is indexed by k = 1, . . . , K. For simplicity, each location k has exactly one plant, which has a constant marginal cost c k with capacity q k , and each plant is owned by a different producer.
2 Each plant, as well as its owner, is identified by its location. For each location k, there are i k consumers, each of whom demands up to one unit of the good. 3 The reservation value v i of consumer i, which is the marginal utility. Each consumer has a linear utility function:
2 One can easily extend the analysis to the case where different plants in different locations are owned by the same producer. Also, one can assume that location k has a q k mass of infinitesimal producers with marginal production cost c k . This interpretation would be more consistent with the price taking behavior of the generators. For simplicity, however, we assume that each location has a single plant with production capacity q k owned by a price taking firm. 3 We normalize the demand of each consumer to one unit without loss of generality. The case with consumers who demand q d units follows from the case with q d consumers, each of which demand one unit of goods, or q d mass of infinitesimal consumers as long as the players are price takers.
if consumer i consumes q amount of goods at price p , his surplus is
Let I k be the set of consumers located in k, and I = ∪ K k=1 I k be the set of all consumers in the economy.
Let q ki be the amount of goods that is delivered from plant k to consumer i. Then, i∈I q ki is the amount of the goods produced by plant k, and
is the total amount of goods delivered, and therefore, consumed by consumer i. We assume that the production capacity of plant k is q k < ∞:
and that consumer i demands up to 1 unit of the good:
The product has to be transported for consumption through a particular network of transmission lines. We assume that the good is not storable. 4 Thus, a good is produced if, and only if, it is delivered to a consumer. For simplicity, in the basic model, we shall assume that the transportation is free and transportation loss does not exist. The analysis of the basic model can be easily extended to the general case. This simplifying assumption also helps us illuminate the impact of the network structure on the equilibrium outcome.
The good must be transported along a particular route, which is specified by the network structure imposed upon the set of locations
We say that two locations k, k ∈ N are directly linked if there is an edge connecting k and k . We write kk for the edge connecting two locations. In this case, we call k adjacent to k , and vice versa. A route is a sequence of different adjacent nodes. We say that there is a route connecting k and k if there exists
where k j = k j for ∀j = j , and k j−1 and k j are adjacent. To simplify notation, we shall refer to N as the network, whenever the meaning is clear from the context. Also, in order to simplify notation, we write (k → i) to mean a route from plant k to consumer i, instead of (k → k ), where i ∈ I k , whenever the meaning is clear from the context. If a set of locations is separated from the rest of the network, we can always analyze the isolated locations as an independent network. Thus, we shall examine only the connected network.
Definition 2.1. A network N is connected if ∀k, k ∈ N , there is a route connecting k and k .
By its very nature, electricity flows over the entire network if the transmission line is physically connected. The amount of flow over a link is determined by Kirchhoff's law, which dictates the flow of power as a function of voltage difference among different locations and impedance of the transmission lines. As a result, the contract path diverges from the delivery path, which creates many important economic problems, especially the externalities arising from the imperfectly specified property right of transmission (cf. Hogan (1992) ).
In order to maintain the reliability of the network, the voltage is required to remain within a small neighborhood of the target. By taking the Taylor approximation to the flow equation (which is highly non-linear), we can approximate the flow equation by a linear equation and the amount of flow over each link can be calculated by solving simultaneous linear equations (Chao and Peck (1996) ). In particular, if there is only one connection between generator k and consumer i, one can calculate the amount q ki delivered from generator k to consumer i from the linearized flow equation. We interpret q ki as the contract that promises to deliver q ki amount of power from generator k to consumer i, although it does not necessarily imply that all electricity drawn by consumer i is produced by generator k.
5
We shall restrict the analysis to a network in which two locations are connected by a single route, called a radial network. In a certain sense, the radial network offers the best chance to resolve the externalities arising from the peculiar physical characteristics of electricity. Yet, the ensuing analysis reveals that we need to develop a new set of tools to understand how to internalize the externalities.
Definition 2.2. N is a radial network if for ∀k, k ∈ N , there is at most one route.
By a network, we mean a connected radial network throughout this paper.
Because there is exactly one route connecting two locations in a network, we can define
as a route connecting k and k . In a precise sense, a route is a combination of nodes and edges connecting two adjacent nodes. Abusing notation, we write
for location l in the route from k to k , and
for the link connecting l to m along the route from k to k . Let r lm be the transmission capacity of the link from l to m. Since this paper is motivated by the electric power transmission problem, we shall assume that the flow of the good is "directional": we differentiate between the flow from 5 For a complete analysis, see Chao and Peck (1996) . k to k and that from k to k. A similar analysis applies to the case of non-directional link such as phone connections, in which the direction of link between k and k makes no difference.
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Under the assumption of a "directional" commodity, the transmission capacity r lm of link lm means the maximum net flow of goods from l to m:
The first term in the bracket represents the total flow of goods through link lm from l to m, while the second term represents the flow in the opposite direction through the same link, that is, counter flow. The difference represents the net flow from l to m, which cannot exceed r lm . One can define a similar constraint for the opposite directional flow through the same link, which cannot exceed r ml . To simplify analysis, we assume that r lm = r ml . We say that lm is congested if the above weak inequality holds with equality. If at least one link in a route is congested, then we say that the route is congested. Otherwise, we say that the route is un-congested.
2.2. Equilibrium. Every agent in this economy is a price taker. However, in the case that the transmission line is congested, some part of the network is segmented from the rest. Consequently, more than one price may be needed to clear the segmented markets within the same network. To maintain the level of generality needed for analysis, let us for the moment denote p ki for the price that producer k receives for the goods delivered to consumer i. Let p = (p ki ) be the profile of prices, corresponding to the profile of quantities q = (q ki ). We call q an allocation.
Definition 2.3. Allocation q is feasible if
Let Q be the set of all feasible allocations. Clearly, Q is a non-empty compact convex set.
Given (q, p), the consumer's surplus is
6 See section 6.
We say that q is maximizing the surplus of consumer i if there is no feasible allocation q = (q kj , q ki ) i =j∈I,k∈{1,...,K} such that
The producer's surplus is
We say that q is maximizing the profit of producer k if there is no feasible allocation q = (q ji , q ki ) i∈I,k =j∈{1,...,K} such that
It is important to note that the feasibility of the actions of the individual agent is evaluated in the context of the entire allocation.
7
We assume that there are arbitragers in the economy, who can exploit any price differentials to generate profit, although we do not model the specific details of the arbitraging process. Let q be the status quo allocation, which is feasible, and p be the profile of the delivery prices from each plant to the individual consumers. We say that there exists a positive arbitrage profit if ∃i ∈ I k and ∃i ∈ I k such that we can find a small amount of transfer from consumer i to consumer i to exploit the price differential. More precisely, let p k i i be the price of the good delivered from plant k i to consumer i, and similarly, let p k i i be the price from plant k i to i . We say that > 0 transfer from i ∈ I j to i ∈ I j is feasible if
That is, the amount of potential transfer must be available at i ∈ I k and the route from k where consumer i is located to k where i is located must be clear for transferring > 0. In this case, the arbitrage profit is
In general, let ij be the transfer from consumer i to consumer j. Let = ( ij ) be the vector of transfers. Let k i be the plant that sends a positive amount of goods to i, which is subject to arbitrage. We say that = ( ij ) is feasible if each ij is a feasible transfer. The arbitrage profit is
7 In the presence of the externality generated by the counter flow and the finite transmission capacity, the feasible sets are intertwined. Shafer and Sonnenschein (1976) examined the general equilibrium in the presence of an externality. The notion of the competitive equilibrium in this paper follows their formulation.
There exists a positive arbitrage profit if there exists a vector of feasible transfers, = ( ij ), such that
We define a competitive equilibrium as an allocation that exhausts all arbitrage possibilities.
Definition 2.4. A pair (q, p) of feasible allocations and delivery prices is a competitive equilibrium for N if there is no positive arbitrage profit, and (2.4) and (2.5) hold.
Social welfare is measured in terms of the sum of the surplus of consumers and producers. Thus, the objective of the social planner is to maximize the social welfare function
by choosing a feasible allocation q. If a feasible allocation maximizes social welfare W (q), then we say that q is efficient. Notice that the set of feasible allocations is compact and convex, and the objective function in (2.6) is linear with respect to q. Thus, to find the welfare maximizing allocation, it suffices to characterize a local maximum, which is significantly easier to characterize than a global maximum.
EXAMPLE
Let us examine a simple example in order to understand how the externality generated by the finite transmission capacity and counter-flow generates inefficient equilibria.
Example 3.1. Consider two cities, say city 1 and city 2, connected by a single transmission line, whose transmission capacity in either direction is 1 unit. City 1 has a generator that produces power at 0 marginal cost and its production capacity is 1. The demand of city 1 is
City 2 has a generator whose marginal cost is
and its capacity is 3. City 2's demand for the good is determined by the reservation value of the consumers:
We assume that the fixed cost of production is 0, and that there is no transmission loss. Every player is a price taker. In particular, each consumer is infinitesimally small and therefore, cannot influence the market outcome.
Because the competitive equilibrium remains vague about how the market clearing price is determined, when there is a gap between the "marginal" consumer's reservation value and the "marginal" producer's marginal cost, we shall assume an ad hoc selection rule for the market clearing price in order to simplify the example. This selection rule is imposed only to illuminate the key idea: If market i is served by a single supplier, then the market price is set equal to the reservation value of the "marginal" consumer. If market i is served by two suppliers, then the market price is equal to the marginal cost of the less efficient producer. 8 In Appendix A, we construct a more elaborate example to demonstrate that this "ad hoc" equilibrium selection rule can be completely eliminated without changing the main conclusion of Example 3.1.
The following feasible allocationq = (q 11 ,q 12 ,q 21 ,q 22 ) where (3.8)q 11 = 1,q 12 = 0,q 21 = 1,q 22 = 0 extracts the entire gains from trading. The consumers in city 2 are not served, because their reservation value is below the production cost of the "marginal" plant, which is 3. Moreover, we can sustain this allocation as a competitive equilibrium by setting the delivery pricep 1 in city 1 as 3.p 1 = 3,p 2 = 2. It is straightforward to verify that (q,p) wherep = (p 1 ,p 2 ) forms a competitive equilibrium under the ad hoc selection rule we imposed on the example. Let Π i (q) be the profit of the generator i. It is easy to verify that
The consumer surplus is Π c (q) = 4.
The social surplus is the sum of the producer surplus and the consumer surplus, which is 9.4 in this equilibrium. We can construct another equilibrium, which is not efficient. Consider an allocation (3.9) q 11 = 0, q 12 = 1, q 21 = 2, q 22 = 0 and the delivery price vector p = (p 1 , p 2 ) where
Each generator is serving the other city by exporting its entire product. Because the net transportation along the transmission line is 1, this allocation is feasible. In a certain sense, the two generators swap their markets by serving the other city. In this way, each generator becomes a sole supplier of power and the market clearing price becomes equal to the reservation value of the consumers. By selling power to city 1, generator 2 obtains the total surplus of 6.4, and similarly, generator 1 obtains the profit of 2 from selling power to city 2. Π 1 (q) = 2; Π 2 (q) = 6.4.
8 If the market is served by a single supplier, then the monopolistic supplier should be able to charge the highest possible price the consumer is willing to accept. On the other hand, if the two suppliers compete for the same market, then the Bertrand competition between the two suppliers would drive the market price to the marginal cost of the less efficient supplier. We choose this particular method of price determination in order to ensure that the same conclusion obtains when we replace price taking behavior by strategic behavior as will be done in Example G.
In this outcome, the consumer surplus is 0, because the delivery price in each market is equal to the reservation value of the consumer. It is not obvious that (p, q) is a competitive equilibrium, because the feasibility constraint is binding in this equilibrium. Generator 2 obviously maximizes its profit. To show that generator 1's action is optimal, note that it is necessary to switch the export to city 2 to the consumption in city 1 where the delivery price is higher. But, if q 1 = (q 11 , q 12 ) generates higher profit than (q 11 , q 12 ), then we need
implying that the transmission constraint is violated. Consequently, no profitable unilateral deviation is feasible for generator 1.
9 Therefore, (q, p) forms a competitive equilibrium.
Although the net flow over the transmission line is 1, the total flow over the same line is 3. Generator 2 is facing the transmission capacity constraint, because the net flow from city 2 to city 1 hits the maximum transmission capacity. Even though the transmission capacity is constrained from city 2 to city 1, it is not feasible for generator 1 to decrease its export to city 2. That is because in order to allow generator 2 to send 2 units through the transmission line whose capacity is 1, it is necessary that generator 1 send 1 unit of power in an opposite direction (counter-flow). With the presence of the counter-flow, the feasible set of actions of the individual generator is intertwined so that a generator cannot change its output even though it does not face any explicit transmission capacity constraint.
At the margin, the power is produced at 3, but the lowest reservation value of the consumer who is being served is 2. Thus, there is loss of social surplus at the margin. The source of inefficiency is the missing market for the service provided by the counter-flow of generator 1 that allows generator 2 to send 2 units, which is 1 unit more than the line capacity, to city 1. Since generator 2 is using for free the extra capacity created by the counter-flow of generator 1, generator 2 ends up producing more than the efficient level.
A successful market design must have a sensible way to internalize the externalities generated by the counter-flows. To understand how to achieve an efficient allocation, we first investigate in Section 4 the structure of the competitive equilibrium. Then, we discuss the policy implications in Section 5.
ANALYSIS OF BASIC MODEL
In order to simplify notation and analysis, we shall focus on the "basic model" in which the demand curve is a step function in each market, and there is no transmission loss as in Example 3.1. After establishing the main result of the paper for the basic model, we show that the same analysis applies for the case where a small amount of power is lost during transmission. It is straightforward, albeit cumbersome, to extend the results from the basic model to the case where the demand curve has a steep downward slope.
9 Some readers would find this equilibrium somewhat pathological, because generator 1 appears to give up a high price of its own market in order to serve the other market at a low price. This kind of suspicion will be addressed shortly by allowing generator 1 to be compensated for the foregone profit. For a moment, let us stick to the definition of the equilibrium.
To understand a key feature of the competitive equilibrium, it would be helpful to imagine a situation in which the demand of northern California is so large that generators located in the south of the state must send the power to the maximum capacity of the transmission line. As a result, the link between ZP26 and NP15 in Figure 1 is congested from south to north. Because the power can no longer flow from south to north, the network is partitioned into two pieces: one partition contains NP15 and all nodes north of NP15, and the other covers ZP26 and the nodes south of ZP26. Note that from NP15, all nodes in the "northern partition" can be reached through "un-congested links". Similarly, from ZP26, all nodes in the "southern partition" can be linked through un-congested links. As the flow of goods is restricted by the congested links, the economy may need more than a single price to clear the market. On the other hand, because the goods can move freely within the "northern" or "southern" partition, an arbitrager can take advantage of any price differentials within the same partition. Thus, within the same partition, there should be a single equilibrium price.
Because the market clearing prices and the congested links are intimately related, the first step in analyzing the competitive equilibrium is to define the partitions induced by the congested links.
4.1. Partition. Given a feasible allocation q = (q ki ), define a relation ∼ as follows: ∀k, k ∈ N , k ∼ k if no link along the route between k and k is congested. It is obvious that ∼ is an equivalent relation. Let T * (q) = {T * t (q)} T t=1 be the partition induced by ∼, where T * t (q) is an equivalence class. We say that two equivalent classes T * t (q) and T * t (q) are adjacent if there exist l t ∈ T * t (q) and m t ∈ T * t (q) such that the transmission capacity of l t m t is constrained.
In general, there are multiple congested links for a partition. Thus, we have to write {l xy m xy } where x ∈ {1, . . . , T } represents the partition where l xy ∈ T * x (q), and y ∈ {1, . . . , N x } for some N x ≥ 1 which represents the number of congested links out of T * x (q). In order to simplify notation, however, we shall assume that
that is, for each partition, there is only one congested link. The analysis of the general case follows from exactly the same logic but only with significantly more complicated notation. From now on, we write l t m t for the congested link where l t ∈ T * t (q). Naturally, we can identify the set of congested links {l t m t } associated with feasible allocation q. By the definition of ∼, each congested link connects two adjacent equivalent classes. We shall follow the convention that the flow from l t to m t is constrained by saying that the link l t m t is congested. In this case, we call T * t (q) which contains l t as the exporting partition, and T * t (q) which contains m t as the importing partition. Within T * t (q), the agent can make a small transfer of goods without violating the feasibility constraint. Thus, whenever the delivery price to two different individuals in T * t (q) differ, one can always exploit the price differential to generate a positive arbitrage profit.
Since there is only one price prevailing in T * t (q), we can call the price p(T * t (q)) identified in Lemma 4.1 the price over T * t (q). 4.2. Equivalent allocations. One can write (2.6) as
Thus, any two allocations generate the same amount of social welfare, if the total amount of production by individual plants, and the total amount of consumption by each consumer in two allocations are the same. It must be emphasized that even if q is sustained by a competitive equilibrium, an equivalent allocation q may not be sustained by a competitive equilibrium.
4.3. Simple allocations. The main difficulty in analyzing the property of an allocation is that the transactions between two different partitions can take many different forms. For a given amount of the net trade over a link, the total amount of goods that flow in either direction can take many different values. Even if the transmission capacity of l x m x is congested, it is not always possible to reduce the amount of flow from l x to m x as shown in Example 3.1. That is because reducing the flow in one direction simply increases the flow of the net flow in the other direction. Hence, if the flow in the other direction is binding somewhere other other than l x m x , we cannot reduce the flow from l x to m x to relax the constraint.
Our next step is to show that we can represent any allocation by the one which has a particularly simple form of "inter-partition" transaction.
Definition 4.3. Fix T * t (q ) for some t ∈ {1, . . . , T } induced by a feasible allocation q . An allocation q equivalent to q is called simple if for any link lm congested from l to m, k∈K i∈I ml∈(k→i)
q ki = 0.
In a simple allocation, whenever link lm is congested from l to m, there is no counter flow from m to l, and only the flow from l to m uses up the entire transmission capacity of lm.
Without loss of generality, we can focus on simple allocations.
Lemma 4.4. For any feasible allocation q , there is a simple allocation equivalent to q.
Proof. See Appendix B.
4.4. Characterization. In the "textbook" case of a competitive market in which no transmission capacity constraint exists, any allocation is simple. Then, the first welfare theorem implies that any equilibrium outcome is efficient. From Example 3.1, we know that the finite transmission capacity constraint generates inefficient equilibrium outcomes.
Yet, the next result shows that we can recover efficiency over the simple equilibrium allocations. Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 4.4 shows that any allocation has a simple equivalent allocation. As Example 3.1 indicates, however, a simple allocation which is equivalent to a competitive equilibrium allocation need not be sustained by a competitive equilibrium. In this case, we can extract useful information about the equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 4.6. Fix a competitive equilibrium (q, p) and a simple allocationq which is equivalent to q. If (q, p) is not a competitive equilibrium, then q is not efficient.

Proof. See Appendix E.
To see how Proposition 4.6 works, let us examine the inefficient equilibrium constructed in Example 3.1. The inefficient equilibrium outcome is not simple, because the total flow through the transmission line is 3, which is larger than the net flow of 1. The simple allocationq which is equivalent to the equilibrium iŝ q 11 = 1,q 12 = 0,q 21 = 1,q 22 = 1.
The equilibrium delivery price in city 1 is 5, which ensures that both generators make positive profit in the simple allocationq. However, the delivery price 2 at city 2 is below the marginal production cost of generator 2, which is 3. Thus, in city 2, generator 2 is losing money, and therefore, fails to maximize its profit inq.
One can view Proposition 4.5 as the first welfare theorem over the set of simple allocations. We can obtain the second welfare theorem over the simple allocations.
Proposition 4.7. Let q be an efficient allocation. Then, there is a simple equivalent allocationq that can be sustained as a competitive equilibrium outcome.
Proof. See Appendix F.
HOW TO INTERNALIZE EXTERNALITIES
Because the mechanism for internalizing externalities is the central part of the market design, it is instructive to examine the California market as a benchmark example. The structure of the competitive equilibrium offers a new insight into improving the existing market design.
Market for FTR.
Because the externality is caused by the lack of the property right to send power over the existing transmission line, a natural remedy for the externalities would be to assign a property right by creating a market for the right to transmit power. Chao, Peck, and Wilson (2000) proposed that a market for firm transmission right (FTR) should be added before the electricity is traded. By purchasing one unit of FTR, the generator is entitled to send power over the specific transmission line to a specific direction. Because FTR is a well defined property right, it can be traded in the secondary market and carries a price. If the line is not congested, the value of FTR should be zero. On the other hand, if the transmission line is congested, the price of FTR becomes positive, because it allows the generator to sell the power through an otherwise blocked route. Thus, FTR can be used as financial compensation for the service provided by the counter-flow from the other generator.
The actual design of the FTR market is quite elaborate in order to accommodate the need for scheduling the production and balancing the load at the same time. Instead of a detailed description of the FTR market, 10 let us examine a simple two stage market that captures the key insight of Chao, Peck, and Wilson (2000) . In the first round, the independent system operator, who is an impartial social planner supervising the operation of the market, sells a transmission right, that is used as a payment to the provider of the counter-flow. One unit of transmission right is needed in order to inject one unit of power by using the counter-flow. The transmission right entitles the provider of the counter-flow to reimbursement of the deposit by the generator who purchases the transmission right in the first round.
Once the FTR market is closed, the second round opens in which each party proposes the quantity to deliver and the delivery price as well as a copy of the transmission right purchased in the previous round, if any. In order for the contracts to be approved by the system operator of the network: (1) the allocations specified by the contracts must be feasible; (2) the transmission right must be tendered to the provider of the counter-flow if one party proposes to send power beyond the normal capacity of the transmission line and therefore, needs the counter-flow from the other party and (3) the reimbursement from the transmission right must be at least as large as the price differential between the two cities. To simplify the analysis, let us assume that in the second stage, if the plan submitted by generators is approved by the system operator, it is executed and the payoff is realized according to the plan. If it is not approved, then each generator receives 0.
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The other primitives of the market, including price taking behavior, remain the same as in Example 3.1.
As a benchmark, let us show that the efficient equilibrium can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome of the "extended" market. In the first round, no transmission right is sold, and the market price for the transmission right is 0. In the second round, the two agents play the efficient equilibrium outcome, whether or not the transmission right 10 Readers can find an authoritative description of the market from the website of the California Independent System Operator: http://www.caiso.com.
11 In reality, there are a series of adjustment phases. Because the load must be balanced in a network, this assumption is not too far removed from reality. As long as the market institution provides a proper mechanism that offers incentive for the participants to balance the load, the same conclusion goes through.
is sold. Our solution concept is rational expectations equilibrium, in which each agent forms forecast conditioned on the observation in the first round, and given his conjecture, he chooses his optimal action conditioned on the outcome from the FTR market. 12 In this way, we ensures that the equilibrium path is not sustained by "incredible threat" off the equilibrium path.
Note that the event that the transmission right is sold as a state variable upon which the agents can form a conjecture about the other agent's behavior. In the efficient outcome, each agent expects the other to play the efficient equilibrium, regardless of the sales of the transmission right. It is clear that the second round behavior of every agent constitutes an equilibrium. Given that in the second round, the efficient equilibrium will be realized, there is no reason for generator 2 to purchase a transmission right. Thus, the equilibrium price of the transmission right would be 0.
Because the agent can form his expectations conditioned on what is realized in the first round, we can also sustain the inefficient equilibrium outcome in Example 3.1 as an equilibrium of the extended market. In the first period, one unit of the transmission right is sold to generator 2 at price of 3. If the transmission right is sold, then the agents play the inefficient equilibrium. If not, then they play the efficient equilibrium.
Along the equilibrium path, the total payoff of generator 1 is the sum of Π 1 (q) = 2, from selling the power to city 2, and 3, which is the price the generator has to tender in order to inject 1 unit of power from city 2 to city 1. Because of the extra income from the counter-flow service, the payoff to generator 1 is larger than that in the efficient equilibrium. On the other hand, the net payoff of generator 2 is 3.4 which is still larger than the payoff from the efficient equilibrium, 2.4. Notice that the equilibrium payoff of each generator is larger than the payoff from the efficient equilibrium, which ensures that no generator has an incentive to deviate in the first round.
In the second period, neither generator has a reason to change its behavior. The price paid for the transmission right is already sunk, and does not influence the marginal behavior of generator 2. If the inefficient equilibrium is played, the minimum amount for generator 2 to secure the transmission of the second unit of the power transmitted to city 1 is 3 per unit (which is the price differential between the two cities). Otherwise, generator 2 receives 0 because the contract is not approved by the social planner due to the lack of compensation to generator 1.
In this equilibrium, the two players use the outcome of the first round as a coordination mechanism. If the transmission right is not sold, then the two agents agree (implicitly) that they will compete in the same market, which delivers low profit. If it is sold, then the two generators swap each market to become a sole supplier of the power to generate higher profit, and to extract more surplus from the consumer at the expense of the social welfare.
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12 We are imposing a sort of sequential rationality or time consistency. 13 The sequential aspect of the extended market is not critical for sustaining the inefficient equilibrium.
Even if the FTR is traded simultaneously with the electricity, there is no guarantee that the price of FTR is precisely the social value of the transmission capacity. That is because what a generator is willing to pay for the service is determined by what he expects to happen, which in turns influences the market price of FTR. Thus, the same inefficient equilibrium exists if the FTR market opens simultaneously with the electricity market.
One peculiar feature of this example is that in the first round, each generator behaves strategically while in the second round, we assume that they are price takers. A natural question would be whether the same conclusion obtains if we maintain the hypothesis of the strategic behavior of each generator throughout the entire game. In Appendix G, we modify this example slightly to allow a fully game theoretic approach.
5.2.
Restriction to simple allocations. In order to achieve an efficient allocation through a decentralized market, it is essential that the private cost of the transmission is the same as its social cost. In the context of the individual optimization problem, the private cost of the transmission is represented by the Lagrangian coefficient for the transmission capacity constraint. The Kuhn Tucker theorem says that in order to ensure that this Lagrangian coefficient is precisely that for the same constraint in the social planner's optimization problem, the constraint qualification condition needs to be satisfied, which requires that the individual generator can always relax the transmission capacity constraint by lowering the amount of power delivered through a particular link. In the inefficient equilibrium constructed in Example 3.1, the feasible set of each generator is singleton and therefore, the constraint qualification condition fails. In this case, the Lagrangian coefficient in the generator's profit maximization problem may differ from the true shadow price of the transmission capacity.
In order to help the FTR market find the "right" price for the transmission right, it is essential that the equilibrium allocation in the second period be always efficient. To do so, the existing electric market design needs an additional layer, between the scheduling of the production and the actual execution of the contract, that is designed to enforce the simple allocation. After every generator proposes its dispatch schedule, the system operator can check whether the proposed plan will induce a simple allocation, or he can simply assign the delivery price according to the simple allocation that is equivalent to the allocation induced by the proposed schedule instead of the proposed delivery price by the generators (Lemma 4.4). By forcing the allocation to be simple, we can ensure the equilibrium to be efficient (Proposition 4.5). By perfectly aligning the private cost with the social cost of the transmission capacity, the market can find the right price for electricity in order to achieve an efficient allocation.
EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS
6.1. Transmission loss. Suppose that as the good is transported, some portion of the original shipment evaporates.
14 To simplify the model, let us assume that the transmission loss over each link is homogeneous: if one unit of good shipped at l to be transferred from l to its adjacent node m, only 1 − ∆ ∈ (0, 1) arrives at m as ∆ amount "evaporates" during the transmission. Let d(k, i) be the number of links between plant k and consumer i. Then, for each unit shipped at k, (1 − ∆) d (k,i) unit is delivered to the consumer and the rest is evaporated. Because we now have to track the loss of each unit delivered from 14 The transmission loss of electricity varies from a few percentage under the usual conditions up to 20% in extremely heavily loaded lines (Bohn, Caramanis, and Schweppe (1984) and Boucher and Smeers (2001) ). every possible location to consumers, the analysis becomes considerably more complicated. Yet, most, if not all, key results from the basic model are carried over as long as the transmission loss is small (i.e., ∆ is close to 0).
Given any feasible allocation q, we can define the partition T * (q) induced by q along with the profile of congested links. It is straightforward, albeit tedious, to show that one can construct a simple allocationq which delivers the same amount of goods to each consumer. The same procedure used in the proof of Proposition 4.4 applies after some modifications to incorporate the loss factors.
Proposition 6.1. For any feasible allocation q, there is ∆ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀∆ ∈ (0, ∆), there is a simple allocationq so that ∀i ∈ I,
When there is transmission loss, the constructed simple allocation is not equivalent to the original allocation. By the construction, consumers have the same amount of goods delivered, but the amount of production changes, because a simple allocation minimizes the number of transactions across a congested link by re-routing the flow of goods. The total number of links that the goods must pass in a simple allocation is always lower than in an inefficient allocation. As shown in the proof of Proposition 4.4, the total number of links that are used to transport a simple allocation is lower than that to transport the original allocation. This saving is reflected in terms of smaller aggregate production in the simple allocation than in the original allocation in order to meet the same level of demand.
Proposition 6.2. There exists ∆ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀∆ ∈ (0, ∆), if an allocation is efficient, then the allocation must be a simple allocation.
Multiple plants.
The analysis can be easily extended to the case where one firm owns more than one plant, some of which are scattered around the network. By arranging the supply schedule of different plants owned by a firm according to the increasing order of marginal production cost, we can construct a supply curve for a firm to apply the same analysis. It must be emphasized that if the generators are strategic, the extension from single plants to multiple plants is not obvious. Because the unit price for the marginal unit can influence the delivery price for the entire amount, the generator has an incentive to over-report its production cost. See Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Wolfram (1998). 6.3. Increasing marginal cost. In order to incorporate a plant with an increasing marginal cost function, we have only to cluster more than one plant in a given location. Then, the new plant obtained by merging different plants in the same location has an increasing marginal cost function, which is an increasing step function. Precisely the same analysis as in this paper applies.
6.4. Non-directional good. If the transmission capacity of a link is determined by the total flow of goods over the link instead of the net flow, then any transaction between two partitions is simple. Thus, any feasible allocation is a simple allocation. Following the same logic as Proposition 4.5, we can prove that any competitive equilibrium is efficient, and that the constrained algorithm generates an efficient competitive equilibrium.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We conclude this paper with remarks on future research projects.
7.1. Strategic play and bounded rationality. While the competitive equilibrium is the benchmark for evaluating the welfare performance of a market mechanism, it should also be a reasonable approximation of the actual market. An important future research project would be to examine whether the competitive equilibrium outcome can be approximated as a limit of a sequence of strategic plays as the number of players increase. Because the deregulated market is built upon some of auctions, this exercise requires to investigate the asymptotic properties of equilibrium outcomes of auctions, subject to the transmission capacity constraint.
As the number of players increases, the game becomes inevitably more complicated. As a result, the rational expectations hypothesis embedded in any equilibrium concept becomes suspect, because it presumes incredibly smart players with unlimited computational capability. This observation prompts economists to look into a more robust approach in analyzing the asymptotic properties of the auctions by relying on less demanding solution concept such as rationalizability (Dekel and Wolinsky (2001) , Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Cho (2002)). Yet, the asymptotic properties under the transmission capacity constraint remain to be investigated. 7.2. Empirical test of welfare performance of a market. Proposition 4.7 is useful for empirically evaluating the welfare performance of the existing market design for the California electricity market. Although the detailed cost information has become a tightly guarded secret following deregulation, 15 it is still possible to construct a reasonable estimator for the marginal production cost and the capacity of the existing fossil fuel burning generators based on the technical specification of the generators and the market price for the fuel. On the other hand, the bidding data for the power could be used to estimate the reservation value and the demand function for the representative consumers in each zone after incorporating the strategic effect. By invoking Proposition 4.7, we can construct a competitive benchmark to evaluate how much the designed market realizes the potential gains from trading, and possibly how much deviation of the delivery price from the marginal production cost can be explained as market power.
7.3. Loop. Lemma 4.4 is essential in analyzing the structure of the competitive equilibrium through simple allocations. If a network is not radial, then some feasible allocations do not have an equivalent simple allocation, which significantly complicates the analysis of the competitive equilibrium (Hogan (1992) and Boucher and Smeers (2001) ). A comprehensive analysis of a general network with loops is beyond the scope of this paper and should be pursued in the future. Instead, let us examine a simple example of a network that has three nodes connected by a loop in order to illuminate the difficulties we will face. 16 This example is intended only to point out the need to develop a whole new set of tools and concepts, and possibly to stimulate discussion. Rigorous investigation of a network with loops is left for a future research project.
There are three cities, indexed as 0, 1, 2, connected by a network of transmission lines as depicted in Figure 2 . Generators are located at cities 1 and 2. For convenience, let us assume that generator i is located at city i for i = 1, 2 and both generators have the same production capacity of 6 units. Generator 1 can produce power at 0 marginal cost, while the marginal production cost of generator 2 is 4. There is 9 unit mass of infinitesimal consumers in city 0, who have reservation value 5. Three locations are linked by a transmission line with the same impedance. Abusing notation, let (i → j) be the "direct" link connecting from city i to city j, although there is another "indirect" route to go from city i to city j through city k = i, j. Let us assume that the transmission capacity of (2 → 0) is 5, that of (1 → 0) is 6 and that of (1 → 2) is 1. As before, the transmission capacity of (i → j) is the same as that of (j → i) for i = j. As in Example 3.1, we assume that there is no transmission loss and that every player is a price taker. Because the indirect route from city i to j is twice as long as the direct link between the two cities, the impedance of the indirect route is assumed to be twice as large as that of the direct link. Therefore, if generator i injects 1 unit of power to be delivered to city 0, then 2/3 of the injected power flows through the direct route, while the remaining 1/3 is flowing through the indirect route.
We claim thatq 1 = 6;q 2 = 3;p = 4 constitutes an efficient equilibrium whereq i is the production of generator i, andp is the market clearing price in city 0. To achieve production efficiency, the efficient generator at 16 The same example, with a minor modification, appears in many papers including Hogan (1992) , Chao and Peck (1996) , and Chao and Peck (1997) , to name a few. city 1 should exhaust the transmission capacity before the less efficient generator at city 2 begins to operate. To let generator 1 operate at its full capacity 6, it is necessary that generator 2 injects 3 units of power in order alleviate the transmission capacity constraint of link (1 → 2). To see this, note that if generator 1 inject 6 units of power into the network, 4 units will flow through the direct link (1 → 0) to consumers at city 0, while the remaining 2 units flow through indirect routes, passing through link (1 → 2) and then (2 → 0). Because the transmission capacity of link (1 → 2) is only 1, generator 1 needs 1 unit of counter flow service from generator 2. If generator 2 injects 3 units, then 1 unit will flow through the indirect route to consumers at city 0, passing through (2 → 1) and then (1 → 0), while 2 units go directly to city 0. As long as the market price of the power at city 0 is 4, no generator has a feasible deviation that can increase its profit. Because the delivery price is 4, the consumer surplus is (5 − 4) × 9 = 9, and the producer surplus is 4 × 6 = 24, because only generator 1 makes a positive profit. Thus, the social surplus is 9 + 24 = 33.
As in Example 3.1, we can construct an inefficient equilibrium (7.10) q 1 = 3; q 2 = 6; p = 5
where q i is the production of generator i and p is the market clearing price. It is easy to check that this allocation is feasible. Because of the counter flow provided by generator 1, generator 2 can send 2 units of power through (2 → 1) and then (1 → 0), while the remaining 4 units flow through (2 → 1). This allocation maximizes the inefficient generator 2's profit which exhausts its production capacity. Note that the capacity constraint of link (2 → 0) is binding, because 4 out of 6 units of power injected by generator 2, and 1 out of 3 units of power injected by generator 1 flow through (2 → 0). Thus, generator 1 cannot increase its sale, even though the transmission capacity constraint of (1 → 0) is not binding. Because generator 1 has no feasible deviation that can increase its profit, (7.10) constitutes an equilibrium.
Because a consumer is paying his reservation price 5, the social surplus is exactly the producer surplus which is 21: the sum of generator 1's profit (5−0)×3 = 15 and generator 2's profit (5 − 4) × 6 = 6. Thus, this outcome is not efficient.
The source of inefficiency is the binding transmission capacity constraint of the "indirect" route when generator 1 is injecting the power. If there are many indirect routes, each generator is facing more capacity constraints to meet. As a result, the feasible set of the individual generator may shrink as there are more loops.
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It is impossible for generator 2 to inject 6 units without the counter flow from generator 1. There is no simple allocation which is equivalent to the inefficient equilibrium allocation. By the same token, the efficient equilibrium allocation is not simple. If an allocation is not simple, it is not always straightforward to calculate the shadow price of the transmission capacity from the constrained optimization, because the constraint qualification condition can fail. As a result, it is not clear how to characterize the set of allocations where the first welfare theorem holds. 17 If we eliminate the link (1 → 2) from the network, the only equilibrium is the efficient one. In a certain sense, this example has a flavor of Braess's paradox (Braess (1968) ).
APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE WITHOUT THE AD HOC EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION RULE
Because Example 3.1 relies on a rather ad hoc selection rule, 18 we shall modify Example 3.1 slightly to obtain the same conclusion without relying on the equilibrium selection rule. The key idea is to "perturb" the model slightly so that the demand and the supply curves in market 1 intersect in a single point. While a number of ways to construct a "nearby" model, we opt to change the demand curve slightly, and to introduce a little bit of transmission loss.
Example A.1. Let us make two changes to Example 3. 1. First, instead of (3.7) , assume that the demand of city 1 is We choose > 0 and ∆ > 0 satisfying
For example, one can choose ∆ = 0.5 for small ∈ (0, 0.1).
We claim that the following feasible allocationq = (q 11 ,q 12 ,q 21 ,q 22 ) where (A.13)q 11 = 1,q 12 = 0;q 21 = 1 − 0.6 1 − ∆ ∼ = 1,q 22 = 0.
is an efficient equilibrium, which is close to (3.8).
Since the players are price takers, we can construct the aggregate supply curve in city 1 (A.14)
because the maximum amount that can be delivered to city 1 from city 2 is 1 − ∆. Similarly, the demand curve in city 1 is
As depicted in Figure 3 , the demand and supply curves intersect at p = 3 which is the competitive equilibrium price, and the total gain from trading is
which is fully realized in this competitive equilibrium. Notice that the consumers in city 2 are not served at all, because the marginal cost becomes higher than 2 in order to produce more than the equilibrium quantity 2 − 0.4 . The social surplus is decomposed into the profit of generator 1 Because of (A.11), the capacity constraint is not binding and the equilibrium price is determined at the marginal production cost of generator 2, which is 3. We construct an inefficient competitive equilibrium, which corresponds to (3.9) in Example 3.1.
(A.16) q 11 = 0, q 12 = 1, q 21 = 2 − ∆, q 22 = 0 and the delivery price p k in city k is p 1 = 5, p 2 = 2.
Even if generator 1 injects 1 unit of power at city 1, it can only provide 1 − ∆ units of counter-flow at the end of the line (or at the point of injection at city 2). Thus, the maximum amount of power that can be injected by generator 2 is 2 − ∆(= 1 + (1 − ∆)). Because of the transmission loss, only (1 − ∆)(2 − ∆) is delivered to city 1 from city 2. By (A.12), the actual amount delivered to city 1 is less than the demand at price p ≤ 5 in city 1, which is 2 − . Thus, the supply curve in city 1 is
Because of (A.12), the transmission constraint is binding, and the supply curve becomes vertical over the range of p > 3 as depicted in Figure 4 . Consequently, the market clearing price is 5 and the entire gains from trading in city 1 becomes the profit of generator 2 which is Π2(q) = 6.4 − 12∆ + 5∆ 2 ∼ = 6.4.
On the other hand, generator 1 injects 1 unit of power in city 1, but only (1 − ∆) unit is delivered. Thus, the supply curve in city 2 is
which is a vertical line, and the market clearing price is determined at the reservation value of the consumer in city 2 which is 2. Hence, the entire gains from trading in city 2 also becomes the profit of generator 1 Hence, the total gains from trading realized in this equilibrium is
For small > 0 and ∆ > 0, this is smaller than the social surplus from (A.13).
Recall that we chose and ∆ to satisfy (A.12) so that generator 2 is using all its transmission capacity including the capacity created by the counter-flow from generator 1. Note that to increase the profit, it is necessary to switch the export to city 2 to the consumption in city 1 where the delivery price is higher. But, because (A.12) holds, if generator 1 reduces the flow from city 1 to city 2, generator 2 can no longer inject (1 − ∆)(2 − ∆) in city 2, implying that the transmission constraint is violated. APPENDIX B. PROOF OF LEMMA 4.4
Fix a partition T * t (q) for which every net trade across the congested link is import. Fix a congested link ltmt. By the definition, mt ∈ T * t (q) ⊂ T (mt) where T (mt) is the sub-tree with its root at mt. Define
as the total quantity of goods that pass through l t , which is originated from T (m t ). Similarly, define
Since the flow from l t to m t is congested,
We shall re-route the goods that pass through ltmt according the following steps.
(1) Order the recipients of the goods in T (lt) which is delivered from T (mt) according to the reservation value:
where L is the number of consumers who receive the goods produced in T (mt). Then, assign a "pseudo demand" to consumer i j asq i j = k∈T (m t ) q ki j for j = 1, . . . , L. (2) Order the plants in T (l t ) which sends goods to consumers in T (m t ) according to the production cost:
where M is the number of plants that send a positive amount of goods to a consumer in T (m t ). Then, assign a "pseudo capacity" to plant k j asq k j = i∈T (m t ) q k j i for j = 1, . . . , M . (3) Allocate the pseudo capacity of plants listed in step (2) to the pseudo demand of consumers identified in step (1) in the "usual" manner: by matching the lowest cost producer to the consumer with highest reservation value before moving to the next most efficient producer or to the consumer with the next highest reservation value. Since q(mt, T (lt)) > q(lt, T (mt)), this process must stop when the pseudo demand of every consumer identified in the previous step is met. By that time, we can identify a pseudo marginal plant k j from the list of plants identified in step (1) so that if a plant k in the same list is less efficient than k j (i.e., c k > c k j ), then its full pseudo capacityq k is available. Let q k j be the remaining pseudo capacity of the pseudo marginal plant. Let K l t be a subset of plants identified in step (2), which still has a positive pseudo capacity. (4) Arrange the recipients of goods in T (m t ) delivered from T (l t ) according to the reservation value:
Let K m t be the set of plants in T (m t ) that sends a positive amount of goods to a consumer in T (l t ).
Letq k = i∈T (l t ) q ki be the pseudo capacity of the plant in Km t . Arrange all plants in K l t ∪ Km t according to the production cost:
where M is the total number of plants in K l t ∪ K m t . (6) Allocate the production capacity of plants in K l t ∪ Km t to consumers identified in step (4) in the "usual" manner by matching the consumer with the highest possible reservation value to the plant with the lowest production cost, before moving to the next highest reservation value consumer or the next lowest production cost plant. Stop this process when either all pseudo demand of consumers identified in step (4) is met, or all pseudo production capacity of plants in K l t ∪ K m t is exhausted. Note that each step is feasible because we are simply using the same route which is already used in the original allocation. Repeat the same process for each congested link. Repeat the same process for each partition whose net trade across the congested links is import. Repeat the same process to the adjacent partition to the partition to which the entire process has applied. The resulting allocation is a simple allocation, equivalent to the original allocation. APPENDIX C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.5
It would be useful to write down the constrained optimization problem of the individual producer and consumer at equilibrium (q * , p * ). For ∀k ∈ K, producer k maximizes
by choosing q k = (q ki )i∈I , whereλ k is the Lagrange multiplier for the production capacity constraint and λ = (λ lm ) is the vector of the Lagrange multiplier for the transmission capacity constraint. Similarly, for ∀i ∈ I, consumer i maximizes Moreover, because q * is a simple allocation, it is feasible for each producer to reduce its production slightly. Thus, we can find a small δ > 0 and an allocation q ∈ N δ (q * ) such that all constrains are satisfied with strict inequalities so that the constraint qualification condition holds for ∀i, k. By applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, there exist λ * = (λ * k ) k∈K ,λ * = (λi)i∈I , and λ Proof. To see p1 = p2 = 3 constitute an equilibrium, first observe that no generator has incentive to lower the price. To complete the proof, we have to show that neither generator has incentive to raise the price above 3.
To simplify notation, we shall establish the result under the most difficult condition, namely = 0 and ∆ = 0. If = 0, the demand curve becomes completely inelastic so that the incentive to raise the price becomes strongest.
The consumer's strategy is to choose a generator which offers the better expected value. Let (p 1 , p 2 ) be the pair of prices that are announced by the generators. Suppose that p1 > p2. The other case follows from the symmetric argument. Let
be the proportion of the consumers who choose generator 2 in excess of its capacity 1. (Recall that we assume there is no transmission loss. Thus, the maximum that can be delivered from city 2 is 1.) Because generator 2 has now 1 + x(p1, p2) consumers, while its capacity to meet the demand in city 1 is 1 (the transmission capacity constraint with no loss), generator 2 rations its power according to probability 1/(1 + x(p 1 , p 2 )). If x(p1, p2) ≤ 1, then consumers are indifferent between generator 1 which offers high price p1 but will serve with probability 1, and generator 2 which offers lower price p 2 but will serve with probability 1/(1 + x(p 1 , p 2 )) < 1. If x(p 1 , p 2 ) = 1, then generator 1's price p 1 is so high that every consumer opts for generator 2 who will serve each consumer with probability 0.5. Clearly, in any sequential equilibrium, the consumer's equilibrium strategy must meet this condition. Given the consumer's strategy, and generator 2's equilibrium price p2 = 3, generator 1's profit from charging p 1 ≥ 3 is −2p
which is decreasing over p 1 ∈ [3, 5] . Thus, generator 1 has no incentive to increase the price. Similarly, given generator 1's equilibrium price p1 = 3, generator 2's profit from charging p2 ≥ 3 is where the first term represents the profit associated with 0 marginal cost, and the second terms represents the profit associated with the marginal cost 3. The first term decreases, but the second term increases. However, because the proportion of the first term is close to 1 (say, bigger than 2/3), the effect from the first term dominates and consequently, the profit decreases as p 1 increases over 3. This completes the proof that p 1 = p2 = 3 forms an equilibrium outcome when = ∆ = 0. For small positive , ∆ satisfying (A.11) and (A.12), exactly the same analysis applies only with more complicated notation. To show the second part, we shall use the fact that , ∆ > 0 satisfies (A.11) in a crucial way so that generator 1 has excess capacity to use. It would be instructive to see that if (A.11) does not hold, say = ∆ = 0, then there are multiple equilibria. For example, p 1 = p 2 = 5 is an equilibrium outcome. Neither party can increase its profit by slightly undercutting the price because the capacity constraint is binding, and neither firm can sell more goods at a slightly lower price.
To establish the second part by way of contradiction, suppose that
Then, we can find a small ρ > 0 such that F 1 (p 1 + ρ) > 0. But, by raising the prices in [p 1 , p 1 + ρ] to (p 2 + p 1 + ρ)/2, generator 1 only increases the delivery price while making the same amount of sales. Thus, p 1 < p 2 cannot occur in an equilibrium. The other case in which p 1 > p 2 follows from symmetric argument.
To prove
suppose that (G.28) p 1 = p 2 > 3.
At p 1 , the market demand in city 1 is 2 − 5 p 1 and the maximum amount which generator 2 can deliver to city 1 is 1 − ∆. Because of (A.11),
Under (G.28), generator 1 must sell at least 1 unit of power at p 1 . Otherwise, generator 1 can always lower the price slightly to increase the sale and the profit. Similarly, at p 2 , generator 2 must sell at least 1 − ∆ units of power. Otherwise, generator 2 can charge slightly less than p 2 but more than 3 to sell up to 1 − ∆ units of power, and increase the profit. This is possible because p 2 > 3 by (G.28).
However, because 1 + (1 − ∆) is larger than the total demand 2 − 5 p 1 at p 1 = p 2 , these two conditions cannot hold simultaneously. Thus, it is impossible that (G.28) holds in an equilibrium.
The last part of the proposition follows from the second part immediately. Because the profit obtained by each price over the support of F i must be the same, the equilibrium profit of generator 1 must be equal to p 1 . Because we know p 1 ≤ 3, the profit of generator 1 cannot exceed what it can obtain under the inefficient equilibrium constructed in (3.8). If p 2 = p 1 = 3, then the profit of generator 2 is precisely what it can obtain in (3.9). If p 2 = p 1 < 3, then generator 2 is losing money by supply more than 0.8 unit, because the marginal production cost above 0.8 unit is 3. Thus, its profit cannot exceed 0.8p 1 which is strictly less than the profit from (3.8).
Q.E.D.
We have shown that the equilibrium profit from the efficient equilibrium when the two generators compete in Bertrand fashion cannot exceed the profit from (A.13). Thus, it can serve as a credible threat off the equilibrium in order to sustain the inefficient equilibrium path constructed in Example A.1.
